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STATE OF UTAH 
LEWIS F. HANSEN. dba 
Hansen Realty Company, 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
vs. 
IVY B. SNELL. 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
9169 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent takes no exception to the statement of facts 
in the brtef of appellant. Such disagreement as exists between 
the parties as to the evidence and in what light it is before 
this Court will be pointed out in the argument. 
It appears that there is duplication in the several points 
enumerated in appellant's brief. evidenced by the fact that 
points 5. 8, 9 and 10 simply incorporate by reference arguments 
made under other captions. 
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·As to the other points, respondent wili use the same num-
bers as those contained in the brtef of appellant but will state 
the points affirmatively to respondent. 
POINT 1. SECTION 42-2-1 UCA 1953 DOES NOT 
PRECLUDE MAINTENANCE OF THIS 
ACTION. 
This statute, which is quoted at page 17 of appellant's 
brief, clearly distinguishes between the name which a party 
may use for his business and the affidavit which a person 
must file. The affidavit is to contain the full name of the 
party; but the fictitious name, use of which brings the statute 
into play, is the use of a name "other than the real name." 
In this case the plaintiff has used his real surname, calling his 
business the ''Hansen Realty Company.'' Hansen is the party's 
real name and therefore the statute has no application to 
this case. This is the plain conclusion of the annotations in 
45 ALR 198 at 258, and 42 ALR 2d 516 at 558. The fol-
lowing cases in these annotations are in point: Johnston v. 
Ellis, 49 Idaho 1, 285 p. 1015; Messick v. Haux Bros., 105 
Cal. App. 637, 288 p. 434; Cone v. Ballou, 251 N.Y.S. 791; 
Asplund v. Pearce, Porter & Martin, 181 Okla. 320, 73 P. 2d 
866. This Court has not ruled on this question. 
Even if it be assumed, for purpose of argument, that the 
statute has application to the facts of this case, the authorities 
are overwhelming that this is no bar or disability to bringing 
action on a matter involved in the business. 45 ALR 198 at 
208, 216; 42 ALR 2nd 516, at 524-525. There is no contrary 
case to this assertion and the cases holding that the statute is 
not a bar to maintenance of the action include the following: 
Oakason v. Lisbon Valley Uran. Co. (D.C. Utah) 154 F. 
Supp., 692; Galiafent v. Tucker, 48 Ida. 280, 281 p. 375: 
Grody v. Scalone, 408 III. 61, 96 N.E. 2d 97; Ambro Adv. 
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Agency v. Speed-Way Mfg. Co .. 211 Iowa 276. 233 N.W. 
499. Again. this Court has not previously passed on this 
question. 
POINT 2. THE AMOlJNT OF THE COMMISSION 
WAS ESTABLISHED. 
It is true that Exhibit 1-P calls for ''the Salt Lake Real 
Estate Board Commission"; the complaint prayed for com-
mission in the amount of $2,150 (R. 2) and there was no con-
troversy whatsoever as to this being the correct amount. 
Paragraph 6 of the complaint (R. 2) alleges "the real 
estate commission called for by said Exhibit 1 is 5% of $43.000 
or $2. 150." The amended answer in paragraph 11 "denies 
that plaintiff is entitled to the sum of $2, 150 or any other sum 
for a commission *** and alleges the fact to be that plaintiff 
has in the manner above alleged been representing the pro-
posed purchaser.'' ( R. 8) Thus no issue was made as to the 
amount of commission but only to the question of whether 
the commission had been earned. 
No issue was made as to the amount of the commission 
at the pre-trial. the Court thus framing issue No. 3: "Has 
plaintiff performed in accordance with the terms of the said 
contract so as to be entitled to receive and collect his com-
mission?" (R. 12) The phrase, "his commission" could apply 
to nothing other than the amount of commission as alleged 
in the amended complaint. One of the purposes of pre-trial 
is to reduce the issues. 
POINT 3. THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THE BUYER 
TO HAVE CONTINUED TO BE READY. 
WILLING AND ABLE TO PURCHASE. 
Appellant overlooks in his brtef the letter from the at-
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tomey for the purchaser of February 26, 1959 (Exhibit 7) as 
specified in Finding No.7. (R. 88) 
The buyer is shown by this letter and by its original con-
tract (Exhibits 2, 11, 7) to be anxious to purchase this property 
either for cash or on any terms as to payment which the seller 
would specify, provided the interest be. the legal interest of 
six per cent ( 6% ) . This interest continued right to the time 
of trial. ( R. 20) Appellant is attempting to inject into "ready, 
willing and able to buy'' an acceptance of the demand for ten 
per cent interest. Whether this demand was within the power 
of appellant to dictate as one of the "terms" is considered 
under Point 4. 
POINT 4. WHERE THE CONTRACT IS SILENT AS 
TO INTEREST THE LEGAL RATE OF 
SIX PER CENT (6%) IS APPLICABLE. 
As appellant recognizes, this is a two-part argument: 
First, does the legal rate become the maximum where the con-
tract does not specify a higher rate; and second, does discretion 
as to "terms" include discretion to establish a rate of interest 
higher than "the legal rate?" 
As to the first point, the purpose of the statute seems to 
be plain. The phrase "legal rate" does not apply to the rate 
that will apply to judgments, nor to the maximum amount that 
may be collected and seems to refer to the normaL ordinary 
rate of interest that may be applied to actual or implied con-
tracts where interest is called for and no rate has been agreed 
upon. If this is not the purpose of Section 15-1-1, UCA, 1953. 
then the purpose escapes us. This is the holding and the 
rationale of the following cases: State v. Danielson, 22 U. 
220, 223, 247 P. 2d 900; Baker Lumber Company v. Clark. 
53 U. 336, 350, 178 P. 764; Salt Lake Wet Wash Laundry 
v. Colorado Animal By Products, 104 U. 385, 388, 140 P. 
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2d 344; l\1cCarty v. Harris. 216 Ala. 265. 113 So. 233; Key-
stone Hardware v. Tague. 246 N. Y. 179. 58 N.E. 27. 53 
A. L. R. 610; Cavanna v. Brooks. 97 N. J. Eq. 329. 127 
At. 247. 37 A. L. R. 360. 374. 375. 
Appellant wants to read in the phrase "terms to suit 
seller" the power to fix interest rates. which. coupled with 
other provisions. will enable the seller to raise the price if she 
finds a purchaser eager to buy. This would make the contract 
illusory and the conduct of the seller and the plaintiff fraudu-
lent so far as the purchaser is concerned. A person listing a 
property for sale at $43,000.00 could not find a better purchaser 
than the plaintiff here has produced. Bennett Motor Company 
was willing to buy the property for cash or upon any terms 
which the seller cared to specify and has not balked at the 
terms proposed by the seller, in the communication of January 
26. except as to the rate of interest, which when combined 
with the small monthly payment would compel the purchaser 
to buy the property nearly twice over before it is paid for. 
In order to make the problem more simple and still ac-
curate, let us reduce the letter of January 26, 1959 ( R. 9) 
to a proposal that the $43,000.00 be paid $5,000.00 down and 
$4.800.00 per year at 10% per annum. Interest the first year 
becomes $3,800.00 instead of $2,280.00, leaving a reduction 
of principal in the amount of $1,000 instead of $2,520.00, or 
more than twice the reduction in principal. 
The 10% contract on the $38,000.00 would be paid off 
in 17 years with total payments of principal and interest in the 
amount of $78,898.00: Whereas at 6% it would be paid off 
in 11 years and the total payments would be $52,937.00. Total 
payments, including down payment of $5,000.00 would be 
$83,898.00 as against $57,937.00 at 6% or a difference of 
$25,961.00. 
This obviously was a ruse not within the contemplation 
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of any of the parties until the seller realized that the pur-
chaser was anxious to purchase the land and not merely 
"ready, willing, and able." 
Did reservation of ''terms to suit seller'' include the power 
to fix interest at higher than the legal rate 7 
Obviously "terms" does not include price in this instance, 
since the price was stated in the sales agency contract. Like-
wise, it would seem, "terms" does not include interest since 
interest is established by law at the legal rate unless the contract 
specifies otherwise. "Terms" should therefore include only 
those provisions and conditions other than the price and rate 
of interest. The power to fix terms ordinarily includes the 
power to fix the amount, time and manner of payments to be 
made on the purchase price. Nakdimen v. Fort Smith and 
Van Buren Bridge Co., 115 Ark. 194, 172 S. W. 272; Federal 
Land Bank of New Orleans v. Miller, 199 Miss. 615, 25 So. 
2d 11 at 13, City of Clovis v. Southwestern Public Service 
Commission, 49 N. M. 270, 161 P. 2d 878 at 886, 161 ALR 
504. This question is specifically treated in Words and Phrases 
under the title "terms" and at 86 CJS 604, 62 CJ 718, note 85 
and 719 note 95. Generally speaking, the phrase means the 
right to establish the amount, time and manner of payment, 
and there is no case referred to in these digests, nor which coun-
sel has been able to find after a careful search, which holds 
that "terms" includes interest. 
POINT 6. PLAINTIFF'S BUYER IS READY AND 
WILLING TO PAY SIX PER CENT (6%) 
INTEREST. 
The original attempted acceptance executed by plaintiffs 
buyer was an offer to pay seller's price if she would fix the 
terms (Exhibit 2) . 
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This buyer's response to the appellant's statement of her 
terms indicated a continued willngness by objecting only to 
the ten per cent ( 10% ) interest: 
''. . . on any reasonable terms other than for cash. 
But when you arbitrarily read an exorbitant interest 
rate into a written contract, which leaves the rate blank, 
you are not reasonable, nor fair, and we will not be 
imposed upon just because we want to buy.'' (Exhibit 
7) 
This buyer recognized, as the statute above cited does, that the 
legal interest rate is six per cent ( 6% ) and the letter makes 
plain that it is the excessive rate only which is objected to. The 
court properly inferred in its findings, that which was implicit 
in the letter. Exhibit 7, that the buyer would pay six per cent 
( 6% ) . Also plaintiff informed defendant that his buyer was 
willing to meet any terms, with six per cent ( 6%) interest (R. 
28). 
POINT 7. ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN ALLOWED BY THE COURT. 
The court was asked to fix attorney's fees on the basis 
of the pleadings and evidence of the appearances which had 
been made in the case. (R. 33) There was no objection to 
this by the defendant and no comment by the Court. 
The Sales Agency Contract (Exhibit 1-P) provided: 
"I agree to pay you the commission above stated, and 
in case of the employment of an attorney to enforce 
any of the terms of this agreement, I agree to pay a 
reasonable attorney's fee and all costs of collection." 
The Court found that this recital was made in the con-
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tract, that plaintiff was compelled to employ an attorney and 
that: 
"Plaintiff requested and defenant assented that the 
matter of attorney's fees could be fixed by the Court 
without evidence other than the files and pleadings 
and appearances in connection therewith and the trial 
of the case.'' ( R. 89} 
And then concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to attor-
ney's fees, R. ( 89) from which the plaintiff cross appealed. 
(R. 92) 
The Court has power to award attorney's fees upon the 
files and records in the action. John C. Cutler Ass' n v. DeJay 
Stores, 3 U. 2d 107, 27a P. 2d 700. And plaintiff was entitled 
to attorney's fees in this case. 
POINT II. PLAINTIFF HAS EARNED HIS REAL 
ESTATE COMMISSION. 
Under the contract between the parties it was not neces-
sary that a sale be consummated before plaintiff had earned 
his commission. Under their agreement (Exhibit 1-P) it was 
incumbent upon plaintiff to: 
''Find a buyer who is ready. able and willing to buy 
said property. or any part thereof at said price and 
terms, or any other price or terms to which I may agree 
in writing. . . . " 
It is obvious from the testimony and the documentary evidence 
that plaintiff produced a buyer anxious to buy the property, 
and able so to do, either for cash or for any terms which the 
seller might reasonably specify.-or unreasonably, either, so 
long as the interest was at the legal rate. 
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Defendant told plaintiff and another real estate man that 
she had concluded not to sell the property, (R. 76-77) and 
these agents informed the defandant that she had sold her 
property, and it was up to her to name the terms, "And 
we'll conform to it, within reason." (R. 74) 
Under the Utah cases, if a real estate broker produces 
a buyer ready, willing and able to buy and the seller capri-
ciously or arbitrarily fails or refuses to consummate the trans-
action, this will not preclude recovery of the commission by 
the broker, Hoyt. v. Wasatch Homes, Inc., 1 U. 2d 9, 261 
P. 2d 927; Curtis v. Mortensen, 1 U. 2d 354, 267 P. 2d 237. 
The Court may be interested in the academic inquiry of 
whether the buyer in this case would be entitled to specific 
performance. Interesting cases in this field are to be found in 
23 ALR 2d 164 at 190-211. also 68 ALR 2d 1221 at 1230-33. 
This is a subject for another lawsuit. 
POINT 12. PLAINTIFF WAS NOT UNFAITHFUL 
TO DEFENDANT. 
Defendant knew that plaintiff's business was real estate 
and says she called him with reference to this property because 
she wanted him to have the sale. ( R. 40) Then when the 
plaintiff brought his earnest money receipt for signature, the 
defendant refused to sign and refused to state the terms upon 
which she would sell. ( R. 45-46) Since the plaintiff talked 
to the defendant concerning the attempted acceptance of the 
listing by Bennett Motor Company, there is no question in this 
case of misleading or a breach of the fiduciary duty by repre-
senting another party. It was known to both parties that the 
plaintiff was representing both the buyer and the seller as 
agent and was looking to the seller for his commission. The 
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two cases cited by the appellant are therefore not in point in 
this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence in this case supports the findings of fact 
and shows that plaintiff found a good buyer for the defendant, 
ready, willing and able to buy and that all defendant had to do 
was sell for cash or indicate the terms she would accept in order 
to consummate the transaction. It appears that actually she 
had concluded not to sell and so told plainitff and the other 
real estate broker. Later. she concluded to submit terms with 
an exorbitant interest rate which the buyer again approved and 
accepted conditioned upon keeping the interest rate to the legal 
rate. As of the time of the trial. and as of the time of this 
brief. the buyer is still ready. willing and able to buy if the 
seller will stand by her original listing of $43,000 cash or will 
state terms with interest at the legal rate. 
Respondent has no explanation of why the District Court 
did not fix attorney's fees and contends that the case should 
be affirmed except as to attorney's fees and that it should be 
remanded so that the District Court may fix attorney's fees 
upon the records before the Court. 
Respectfully submitted. 
RICHARDS. BIRD AND HART 
Attorneys /or Respondent. 
716 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
